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indicate that the past history of realized shocks play a crucial role in determining the
dynamic effects of monetary policy on the yield curve. Finally, the regime-switching
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1 Introduction
How does monetary policy impact the term structure of interest rates? The answer
to this question is of interest to central bankers who want to understand how their actions
affect long-term interest rates and consequently the economy. This topic is also relevant
for bond market participants so that they can make informed investment decisions. Thus
it is no surprise that there is a growing literature that tries to analyze this issue.1 As
is common in the monetary policy literature most of these analyses use a simple Taylor
rule to model monetary policy. But as macroeconomic models become more sophisticated,
increasing attention is being paid to the modeling of optimal monetary policy. However, an
optimal policy framework with forward looking agents gives rise to the time-inconsistency
issue, which is well known since the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983). The policy maker can reap the benefits of shaping agents’ expectations by
announcing a plan and credibly committing to it. But this policy is not time-consistent as
the policy maker has an ex-post incentive to deviate from the promised plan. The optimal
monetary policy literature has dealt with this issue by assuming either that the central bank
has access to a commitment technology (full commitment case) or that they re-optimize
every period (discretion case). Yet neither of the two dichotomous cases of discretion or
full commitment seems reasonable in practice.2 Moreover, recent theoretical and descriptive
evidence suggests that assumptions about central bank credibility may have a key effect
on the term structure.3 In this paper we use the general framework of loose commitment
(this nests both the full commitment and discretion cases) and explore both theoretical and
empirical implications for the term structure of interest rates.
We begin by considering a simple theoretical model to shed light on the effects of op-
timal monetary policy on the term structure. This analysis generalizes the work of Palomino
(2012) where only discretion and commitment are considered. We use the framework of loose
commitment, following the work of Roberds (1987), Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) and
Debortoli and Nunes (2010). This is a flexible setting in which the central bank has the
ability to commit to its future plans, but it may occasionally give in to the temptation
to re-optimize plans. These re-optimization episodes are modeled using a regime-switching
1See recent papers by Campbell et al. (2014), Ang et al. (2011) and Bikbov and Chernov (2013) and
references therein.
2In an empirical study with a medium scale DSGE model, Debortoli and Lakdawala (2016) show that
both full commitment and discretion are rejected by the data.
3See the analyses of Palomino (2012) and Campolmi et al. (2012) for a detailed discussion.
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process where both the policy maker and the agents are aware of the possibility and take
it into account when forming expectations. We embed optimal monetary policy within the
loose commitment framework in a simple New-Keynesian model where a cost-push shock
drives the dynamics. The degree of credibility has a key effect on the covariance between
the agents’ stochastic discount factor and bond returns. This in turn determines whether
long-term bonds are viewed by investors as acting as a hedge or increasing their risk. The
typical assumption of full commitment or discretion can have stark implications for yield
curve. In contrast, the loose commitment setting provides a more flexible framework where
different values for the degree of credibility can generate a wide variety of properties for the
yield curve. The loose commitment framework also affects the dynamic behavior of the yield
curve through the effects of re-optimization shocks. The response of the economy and bond
prices to re-optimization shocks is history dependent and this setting can help generate rich
and complicated dynamics for the entire yield curve.
Having highlighted the main mechanisms in the simple model, we then estimate a
fully specified medium scale DSGE model using US data on both macroeconomic variables
and bond yields. The analysis is conducted in the model based on the work of Smets
and Wouters (2007). We depart from that model in two important ways. First, monetary
policy is conducted by a central bank operating under loose commitment, rather than being
described by a simple interest rate rule. Second, we augment the model with yield data
and derive bond prices that are consistent with the stochastic discount factor of the agents.
The degree of credibility affects the agents’ expectations for both macro variables and bond
prices, and is a parameter of the model that is estimated. The presence of re-optimization
shocks generates regime-switching dynamics in the state variables. We derive bond prices in
this framework using a log-linear approximation as in Bansal and Zhou (2002) and Ang et al.
(2008) among others. Additionally, for estimation purposes this requires the use of regime-
switching techniques. We use a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo procedure following
Debortoli and Lakdawala (2016).
The degree of credibility of the Federal Reserve is estimated to be 0.6, which is a
little lower than the estimate of Debortoli and Lakdawala (2016) where they do not use
term structure data. The use of quarterly data implies that re-optimizations are expected to
occur roughly once every 2.5 quarters. An advantage of the estimation framework is that it
allows for the identification of historical episodes when the Federal Reserve likely abandoned
its commitments, as measured by the (smoothed) probability of re-optimization. We find
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that policy re-optimizations likely occurred throughout the sample with the exception of the
period from late 1980s to early 1990s. Using impulse responses we emphasize the history
dependence in the effects of re-optimization shocks. The effect of a re-optimization that is
preceded by a markup shock makes yields lower relative to the case where no re-optimization
occurs, while a re-optimization preceded by a technology shock has the opposite effect. An
analysis of the historical effects in U.S. data reveals that the contemporaneous effect of re-
optimizations is larger for medium maturities than at the short and long end of the yield
curve. To understand the effects on the entire yield curve we construct simple measures
representing three factors that are commonly used in the literature: level, slope and curva-
ture. The biggest effects of the re-optimization shock occur with a lag of about two years.
Comparing the model implied effects of re-optimization shocks to the data, we notice that
while the re-optimizations have a non-negligible effect on the level and slope of the yield
curve, they have a relatively bigger effect on the curvature.
With the rich DSGE model, we can perform a structural decomposition of the shocks
contributing to the yield curve. We find that demand and markup shocks are the main
drivers of bond yields, while technology shocks have a limited influence. Finally, we conduct
a counterfactual analysis to explore how yields would have behaved under different credibility
scenarios. We find that neither full commitment or discretion can satisfactorily characterize
the yield dynamics captured by the loose commitment setting and that under discretion
bond yields would have been much lower than the data. We conclude that the flexibility of
the loose commitment framework helps significantly in explaining term structure data from
the perspective of a structural macro model.
Our work is related to a growing macro-finance literature that tries to combine struc-
tural macro models with the term structure of interest rates. Early work, like Hordahl et
al (2006), Rudebusch and Wu (2008) combined simple New-Keynesian models with an ad
hoc stochastic discount factor to price long-term bonds. In contrast, here we derive the
stochastic discount factor and the implied bond price dynamics that are consistent with the
inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution. Starting with Bekaert et al. (2010), there are
several empirical studies that use this approach, with more recent work that generates a
time-varying term premium in a DSGE framework. Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) and
Van Binsbergen et al. (2012) use a third order approximation, Chib et al. (2010) use regime-
switching in the monetary policy rule and shock volatility, Dew-Becker (2014) uses time
variation in the risk aversion parameter, while Song (2014) considers regime-switching co-
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variance between inflation and consumption growth. In our empirical setup we do allow
for regime switching in the variance of the shocks. However the re-optimization shock is
assumed to be i.i.d. and thus monetary policy does not contribute to any time variation
in the term-premium. The i.i.d. assumption is necessary to keep the model tractable for
estimation. While we recognize this limitation of our framework, the focus of the paper is to
study the effects of optimal monetary policy setting on the term structure. Ours is the first
paper to empirically estimate a DSGE model with optimal monetary policy and the term
structure, while all the papers mentioned above specify a simple reduced from Taylor-type
rule to model monetary policy. Moreover, we use the flexible loose commitment framework
to explore the role of credibility on the term structure.
The remainder of the paper is divided in two main parts. In the next section we
describe the loose commitment framework and use a simple model to explain the basic
conceptual issues involved in optimal monetary policy setting in this framework and its
implications for the yield curve. In Section 3 we start with a brief overview of the DSGE
model and the estimation algorithm. Next we present the results from the estimation and
the key term structure results. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks in section 4.
2 Loose Commitment and the Yield Curve
In this section, we first explain the intuition behind loose commitment in a simple
macro model. Then we add bond yields and show how term structure properties are related
to the degree of credibility and how bond yields respond to re-optimization shocks.
2.1 The Loose Commitment Setting
The working assumption is that the central bank has access to a commitment tech-
nology, but it occasionally succumbs to the temptation to revise its plans, termed as policy
re-optimizations. This is similar to the assumption in Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007)
and Debortoli and Nunes (2010). Private agents are aware of the possibility of policy re-
optimizations and take it into account when forming expectations. More formally, at any
point in time, monetary policy can switch between two alternative scenarios, captured by
the unobserved state variable st ∈ {0, 1}. If st = 1, previous commitments are honored.
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Instead, if st = 0, the central bank makes a new (state-contingent) plan over the infinite
future, disregarding all the commitments made in the past. The variable st evolves according
to a two-state stochastic process
st =
1 with prob. γ0 with prob. 1− γ
In the limiting case where the probability γ = 1, the central bank always honors its promises
and this formulation coincides with the canonical full commitment case. Instead if γ = 0, the
central bank always re-optimizes, as in the approach commonly referred to as discretion. The
main advantage of this setup is that γ can take on any value in [0, 1] and can be estimated
from the data. Note that the switching is i.i.d. in nature. This means that the probability of
a re-optimization occurring next period is the same, regardless of a re-optimization having
occurred in the current period or not. Debortoli and Lakdawala (2016) provide a discussion
and some suggestive evidence in support of this assumption. From the perspective of asset
pricing, this assumption has important implications that are discussed below.
In the case of the Federal Reserve these re-optimizations could represent a change in
the composition of the Federal Open Market Committee (the Fed’s main policy making arm)
due to appointment of a new chairman or a change in the voting members. Additionally
pressure from the political system or the financial markets may cause a re-optimization. The
results in Debortoli and Lakdawala (2016) suggest that the Federal Reserve does not have
full credibility but that it can be viewed as being close with γ estimated to be around 0.8.
The empirical results from section 3.2 confirm this finding of imperfect credibility but with
an estimate of γ closer to 0.6.
2.2 Loose Commitment in a Simple Model
The main conceptual issues behind the loose commitment framework are illustrated
using a simple model similar to Clarida et al. (1999) and also used by Palomino (2012). Con-
sider a quadratic loss function for the central bank, where the aim is to minimize deviations
of inflation (pit) and output gap (yt) from their target levels. Without loss of generality, the
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targets for both are assumed to be equal to zero.
min
1
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
κy2t + θpi
2
t
]
(1)
This loss function is minimized subject to constraints that govern the dynamics of inflation
and output gap.
pit = βEtpit+1 + κyt + ut (2)
yt = Etyt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1) (3)
The first equation is commonly referred to as the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve and can be
derived from optimal firm pricing behavior. ut is a cost-push shock (also known as markup
shock) that is modeled as an i.i.d. process without loss of generality. The second equation is
called the dynamic IS curve and can be derived from the household optimization problem,
where it is the nominal short interest rate. This equation can be appended with a shock
that could be interpreted as a demand shock. However, this demand shock does not create
a tradeoff for the policymaker and would contribute nothing to the analysis at hand. In
this setup, it is the cost-push shock that creates a tradeoff between inflation and output gap
stabilization. In other words, without the presence of ut optimal policy can be achieved by
setting both pit and yt to zero for each time period. While in the presence of this shock,
the central bank is not always able to simultaneously set both pit and yt to zero. It must
choose the relevant tradeoff which depends on the state of the economy and the central bank
preference parameters. The first order condition for optimal policy under discretion can be
represented by
pidt = −
1
θ
ydt (4)
This equation depicts the classic principle of ”leaning against the wind” and adjusting infla-
tion in the opposite direction to the deviation of output gap from its target.4 The relationship
under full commitment is given by
pict = −
1
θ
[
yct − yct−1
]
(5)
4The d superscript denotes the dynamics of the variables when policy is conducted under discretion.
Similarly we will use the superscripts c and lc for full commitment and loose commitment respectively.
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This equation is similar to the discretion case but now inflation responds to the change
in the output gap rather than the level of the output gap. When formulating optimal
policy under commitment, the central bank takes into account the effects of their policy
on agents’ expectations. This effect is ignored in the discretion case. To get a better
understanding, figure 1 shows the impulse responses to an i.i.d. cost-push shock using
the following calibration: κ = .25, β = 0.99, θ = 1 and σ = 2. Under both discretionary
and commitment regimes, inflation rises on impact and the output gap falls. Under the
discretionary case inflation is high just on impact (period 0) and falls back to zero (the
target value) from the next period. In the commitment case, the central bank promises to
lower inflation in the future and thus the rise in inflation on impact is not as high relative to
the discretionary case. Under discretion the short rate has to be raised enough to completely
absorb the effects of the cost-push shock, while under commitment the short rate does not
have to be raised as much on impact and then it is gradually moved back to zero.
The key point is that agents should trust the central bank to be credible and follow
through with the promise of low inflation from period 2 onwards, after the central bank
has reaped the reward of lower relative inflation in period 1. This is the crux of the time-
inconsistency issue and creates the incentive for the policy maker to re-optimize. If the
central bank is not perfectly credible then we are in the loose commitment setting and agents
assign a positive probability of the central bank reneging on its promises in any period in
the future. Under loose-commitment, the dynamics are affected by a re-optimization shock
st in addition to the cost-push shock. The relations implied by the first order conditions are
now given by
pilct =
{
−1
θ
ylct , if st = 0
−1
θ
(ylct − ylct−1), if st = 1
(6)
Figure 2 shows the effect of an i.i.d cost-push shock under the loose commitment setting with
probability of commitment γ = 0.5. This means that agents expect that a re-optimization
will occur in any period with probability 0.5. The thin blue line shows the response of the
variables in the case that no re-optimization shock occurs. While the blue line with the
crosses shows the behavior when a re-optimization shock occurs in period 3. The thin blue
line shows that the central bank promised to keep inflation low for a few periods after the
cost-push shock but with a re-optimization this promise is not kept and inflation is set to
0, which minimizes the central bank’s current period loss. The inflation response under
loose commitment lies in between the discretion and full commitment cases for the first few
periods. However the dynamic behavior of the variables under loose commitment do not
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have to lie in between discretion and full commitment as can be seen more clearly from the
response of the output gap and the short rate. The crucial determinants of the effects of
re-optimization shocks are the timing of the re-optimization shock and the history of all
other shocks preceding the re-optimization shock.5
Before we derive bond prices in the simple model, we setup the general formulation
of optimal policy in the loose commitment framework. Gathering all the state variables
[yt, pit, it, ut] in xt and the exogenous shock [eu,t] in vt, the system of equations can be written
as
A−1xt−1 + A0xt + A1Etxt+1 +Bvt = 0 (7)
We can write the optimization problem for the central bank in the following format.
x′−1V x−1 + d = min{xt}∞t=0
E−1
∞∑
t=0
(βγ)t[x′tWxt + β(1− γ)(x′tV xt + d)] (8)
s.t. A−1xt−1 + A0xt + γA1Etxt+1 + (1− γ)A1Etxreopt+1 +Bvt = 0 ∀t (9)
The terms x′t−1V xt−1 + d summarize the value function at time t. Since the problem is
linear quadratic, the value function is given by a quadratic term in the state variables
xt−1, and a constant term d reflecting the stochastic nature of the problem. The objective
function is given by an infinite sum discounted at the rate βγ summarizing the history in
which re-optimizations never occur. The first part is the period loss function. The second
part indicates the value the policymaker obtains if a re-optimization occurs in the next
period. The sequence of constraints (9) corresponds to the structural equations (7), with the
only exception that expectations of future variables are expressed as the weighted average
between two terms: the allocations prevailing when previous plans are honored (xt+1), and
those prevailing when a re-optimization occurs (xreopt+1 ). This reflects the fact that private
agents are aware of the possibility of policy re-optimizations, and take this possibility into
account when forming their expectations. The solution uses the concept of a Markov-Perfect
equilibrium and can be shown to be of the form6
ξt = Fstξt−1 +Gvt (10)
5An implication of this is that if a re-optimization shock occurs in the steady-state (when ut = 0) it will
have no effect.
6See Debortoli and Nunes (2010) and Debortoli et al. (2014) for a detailed discussion.
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where ξt = [xt, λt]
′ and λt is a vector of Lagrange multipliers attached to the constraints
(9). In particular, the Lagrange multipliers λt−1 contain a linear combination of past shocks
{vt−1, vt−2, . . . , v−1}, summarizing the commitments made by the central bank before period
t. Therefore, the effects of policy re-optimizations can be described by the state dependent
matrices where a re-optimization involves setting to zero the column of F corresponding to
the Lagrange multipliers
F(st=1) =
[
F xx F xλ
F λx F λλ
]
F(st=0) =
[
F xx 0
F λx 0
]
. (11)
2.3 Bond pricing
We now derive bond prices in a framework where the term structure of interest
rates reflects the dynamic properties of the representative consumer’s elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution (or stochastic discount factor), Mt+1. In particular, let in,t denote
the (continuously compounded) interest rate at time t of a n-period zero-coupon bond, and
mt+1 = ln(Mt+1). We have from the first order condition of inter-temporal utility maximiza-
tion,
e−nin,t = Et
(
e
∑n
τ=1mt+τ
)
(12)
Under the assumption of a stationary joint log-normal distribution, it then follows:
i1,t = −Et(mt+1)− 1
2
V art(mt+1) (13)
nin,t = −Et
(
n∑
τ=1
mt+τ
)
− 1
2
V art
(
n∑
τ=1
mt+τ
)
(14)
We can use the above equations to decompose the yield spread, in,t − i1,t into three parts,
in,t − i1,t =
∑
τ Et(−mt+τ )
n
− Et(−mt+1)
− 1
2
[∑
τ V art(mt+τ )
n
− V art(mt+1)
]
− 1
2
∑
τ1 6=τ2 Covt(mt+τ1 ,mt+τ2)
n
(15)
The first term in the expression above captures the expectation component which implies
that part of of the long-term interest rate, in,t is determined by the expectation of the short-
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term interest rate that will prevail over the life of the long-term bond. The second term
is due to Jensen’s inequality. The third term is risk compensation (or term premium) for
holding the long-term bond. The term premium depends critically on auto-correlations of
the stochastic discount factor. A positively (negatively) auto-correlated stochastic discount
factor implies a negative (positive) term premium and hence a downward-sloping (upward
sloping) yield curve. The intuition is as follows. If today’s bad news about growth is expected
to be followed by further bad news in the future, a bond that promises a fixed payoff in the
future will see its value increase today (as interest rate decreases). This create a positive co-
variance between bond return and investor’s marginal utility today and hence a negative risk
premium. On the contrary, if today’s bad news about growth is expected to be followed by
good news in the future, a bond that promises a fixed payoff in the future will see its value
decreases today (as interest rate increases). This creates a negative co-variance between
bond return and investor’s marginal utility and hence a positive risk premium.
We will use this intuition to explain how the degree of monetary policy credibility
affects the term structure of interest rates below. We start by considering the same simple
model laid out in Section 2.2 above. We assume a power utility function that is consistent
with the dynamic IS curve in (3). The stochastic discount factor for bond pricing can be
written as (ignoring any constant term):
mt+1 = −σ(yt+1 − yt)− pit+1 (16)
where σ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Given the solution to the optimal
policy problem in (10), we can express the stochastic discount factor in general as:
mt+1 = −λ0 − λ′1ξt+1 − λ′2ξt (17)
where λ1 and λ2 load up relevant state variables respectively according to the specification of
the utility function in (16) and the optimal policy solution in (10). Notice that in (10), ξt has
regime-switching dynamics governed by the variable st. We will assume that the structural
shocks in (10) are normally distributed (vt ∼ N(0, Q)) and uncorrelated with each other. We
obtain an analytical solution for the term structure of interest rates under regime switching.
This allows us to solve for the term structure of interest rates in closed form. Let Pn,t denote
the price of a n-period zero-coupon bond at time t. It then follows that, for n ≥ 0,
Pn,t = e
−An−B′nξt (18)
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The detailed derivation of the coefficients An and Bn is provided in the online appendix and
they are given recursively by the following equations
An = An−1 + λ0 − 1
2
(λ1 +Bn−1)′GQG′(λ1 +Bn−1) (19)
Bn = F¯
′Bn−1 + (λ2 + F¯ ′λ1) (20)
where
F¯ = γF(st=1) + (1− γ)F(st=0) (21)
and A0 = B0 = 0.
For n ≥ 1, interest rate, in,t, is given by
in,t =
An
n
+
B′n
n
ξt (22)
Notice that, because st is i.i.d., the coefficients An and Bn don’t depend on the policy regime
st even though st affects the persistence of state variable ξt. To predict F (st+1) at time t
investors simply use the average value of F (st+1). This has an important implication for the
bond risk premium. We define bond risk premium as the expected excess holding period
return of a long-term bond.
rpn,t = Et(logPn−1,t+1 − logPn,t)− i1,t
=
1
2
λ′1GQG
′λ1 − 1
2
(λ1 +Bn−1)′GQG′(λ1 +Bn−1)
= −λ′1GQG′Bn−1 −
1
2
B′n−1GQG
′Bn−1
(23)
The second term in the risk premium expression is simply due to Jensen’s inequality. The
first-term is the negative covariance of bond returns and the stochastic discount factor (under
the macroeconomic shocks vt+1). Since both λ1 and Bn are constant in our model, the
covariance is constant and so is the risk premium. Relaxing the i.i.d. assumption about the
transition matrix governing the re-optimization shock will generate time-varying risk premia.
However this approach makes the estimation strategy intractable and we leave it for future
research.
In the empirical part of this paper (section 3) we estimate the probability of commit-
ment γ in a fully specified DSGE model. There we allow the variance matrix of the shocks
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Q to be regime switching. This introduces time variation in the risk premia which is helpful
for the model to generate volatility for long term bonds that can match the observed data.
This is a popular method in the DSGE term structure literature and is used by Chib et al.
(2010) among others. Since our focus in this part of the paper is to understand the effect of
central bank credibility and re-optimization shocks, we abstract from this complication for
now.
2.4 Degree of Credibility and the Yield Curve
In this section we explore the effect of the degree of credibility on the term structure
in the simple model outlined above.
First, consider the case of discretionary policy (i.e. γ = 0). Recall that the first order
condition implies that inflation responds to the level of the output gap,
pidt = −
1
θ
ydt
Plugging this into the the stochastic discount factor (equation 16), we have:
mdt+1 = −σ(yt+1 − yt)− pit+1 = −
(
σ − 1
θ
)
ydt+1 + σy
d
t (24)
where ydt+1 = − θ1+κθut+1 ≡ χduut+1. In the online appendix we show that this implies
Cov(mdt+1,m
d
t+n) =
{
(1−σθ)σθ
(1+κθ)2
σ2u, if n = 2
0, otherwise
(25)
Thus the sign of the autocorrelation of the stochastic discount factor and hence the sign of
the risk-premium depends on the weight on inflation in the loss function and the risk aversion
parameter. As long as σθ > 1, mdt+1 is serially negatively correlated and the yield curve slopes
upward on average (ignoring the Jensen’s inequality term). The intuition is as follows. Under
discretion, in response to a cost-push shock, output declines and inflation increases.7 Since
the shock is i.i.d., expected output growth increases as the level of output moves back to
its steady state level.8 Higher expected growth leads to a higher interest rate and hence
7We will assume that the natural rate of output is constant so that changes in output are the same as
changes in the output gap.
8Recall from figure 1 that under discretion inflation is an i.i.d. process and expected inflation is zero.
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lower bond price (and thus lower bond return). The sign of the risk-premium depends on
the covariance between the bond return and the nominal stochastic discount factor. The
direction of the movement in the nominal stochastic discount factor depends on the relative
magnitude of σ and θ. If both σ and θ are large (σθ > 1), investors are very concerned with
decreases in output (or consumption) and policy makers are very concerned with increases in
inflation. As a result, in response to a cost-push shock, there will be relatively small increase
in inflation and relatively large decrease in output, and given a large value of the risk-
aversion coefficient, the nominal stochastic discount factor (or inflation-adjusted marginal
utility) increases. On the other hand, if both σ and θ are small (σθ < 1), the opposite is
true, the nominal stochastic discount factor (or inflation-adjusted marginal utility) decreases
in response to a cost-push shock.
In contrast, under a full-commitment policy, inflation responds to changes in output,
pict = −
1
θ
(yct − yct−1) (26)
and hence,
mct+1 = −
(
σ − 1
θ
)
(yct+1 − yct ) (27)
where yct+1 = χ
c
yy
c
t + χ
c
uut+1 and χ
c
y < 1. In the online appendix we show that this implies
Cov(mct+1,m
c
t+n) = −
(
σ − 1
θ
)2 (
χcy
)n−2
(χcu)
2σ2u
(
1− χcy
)2
1− (χcy)2
(28)
Thus regardless of the value of θ and σ, the stochastic discount factor is serially negatively
correlated. Bond risk premium is always positive under a full-commitment policy in this
simple model and the yield curve slopes upward. The reason is that, under full commitment,
the nominal interest rate can either increase or decrease, but it always moves in the same
direction as the nominal stochastic discount factor in response to a cost-push shock regardless
of the relative values of σ and θ. With a full commitment technology, the policy maker can
promise negative inflation (or deflation) in the future at the impact of a cost push shock. If
the nominal stochastic discount increases as in the case of σθ > 1, the expected deflation
will be smaller than expected output growth, the nominal interest rate also increases. If the
nominal stochastic discount factor decreases as in the case of σθ < 1, the expected deflation
will be larger than the expected output growth, the nominal interest rate decreases as well.
Finally, as pointed out by Palomino (2012), yt+1 has a bigger exposure to the cost-
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push shock in the discretionary-policy regime than in the full-commitment policy regime.
From (24) and (27), we have:
mit+1 − Et(mit+1) = −(σ − 1/θ)χiuut+1
where i = d, c. The absolute value of market price of risk under a discretionary policy,
|(σ − 1/θ)χdu|, will be larger than that under a full-commitment policy, |(σ − 1/θ)χcu|. This
has a direct impact on the magnitude of bond risk premiums.
Under loose-commitment, the first order condition implies
pilct =
{
−1
θ
ylct , if st = 0
−1
θ
(ylct − ylct−1), if st = 1
In this case the auto-covariance of the stochastic discount factor has a complicated analytical
solution (it is included in the online appendix). To better understand the effect of the degree
of credibility (γ), in figure 3 we plot the model implied yield curve for different values of γ. In
panel (a) we consider a calibration where σθ < 1. As pointed above, under such a calibration
the yield curve slope is negative under discretion (blue line) and it is positive under full
commitment (yellow line). In the loose commitment setting, the slope is negative for low
values of γ and it becomes less negative as γ is increased before finally becoming positive.
In panel (b) we show the yield curve with a calibration where σθ > 1. In this case the slope
is non-negative for all values of γ and we see the same pattern that the slope increases with
γ.9 The degree of monetary policy’s credibility shapes expectation about future inflation,
and hence has a key effect on the co-movement between the nominal interest rate and the
stochastic discount factor. This effect is reflected in the shape of the term structure of
interest rates. In particular, as γ increases, the monetary policy is more likely to remain on
its promised course. Expected inflation then tends to move in the direction that produces a
positive (negative) co-variance between interest rate (bond return) and the stochastic factor,
and hence an upward sloping yield curve as explained above. The next figure shows how the
unconditional standard deviation of the yield curve depends on γ. Again, panel (a) shows
the case where σθ < 1 and panel (b) shows σθ > 1. The short end of the yield curve is always
more volatile under discretion relative to full commitment regardless of the preference and
policy parameters. This is because, by promising lower (or negative) inflation in the future
9Notice that when σθ > 1 the yield curve is flat instead of sloping upward under discretion (γ = 0)
because a negative Jensen’s inequality term offsets a positive bond risk premium at each maturity.
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with full commitment, the central bank doesn’t need to raise interest rate as much as it does
under discretion in response to a cost push shock. We notice that as γ increases agents have
a higher confidence that the central bank will continue proposed plans and thus they adjust
their current inflation expectations accordingly. Thus the volatility of the short end of the
yield curve decreases with γ. For the second calibration this relationship is true for yields
of all maturities. But in the calibration in panel (a) we see a non-monotonic relationship
where the volatility of long-term rates is the highest for γ = 1.
Overall figures 3 and 4 show that the loose commitment framework is quite flexible
and depending on the probability of commitment (γ) can generate a variety of different
properties for slope and standard deviation of the term structure. In addition to the effect of
γ the loose commitment framework also has important implications for the dynamic behavior
of yields as governed by re-optimization shocks.
2.5 Re-optimization Shocks and the Yield Curve
In this section we analyze the effect of a re-optimization shock on the term structure
in the simple model. As mentioned above, the impulse response to a re-optimization shock is
history dependent. The re-optimization shock involves reneging on past promises which are
captured by the Lagrange multipliers. Thus the effect of the re-optimization shock is to set
the lagged Lagrange multipliers to zero. As a special case, if a re-optimization shock occurs
in the steady state, it will have no effect as the Lagrange multipliers are already zero. While
a re-optimization occurring immediately after a cost-push shock that creates a tradeoff for
the central bank, can have big effects.
In the same vein as figures 1 and 2, figure 5 shows the effect of a cost-push shock
happening at time period 1, followed by a re-optimization shock occurring in period 3. γ
is set to 0.5. The discretion and full commitment paths (which are not affected by the
re-optimization shock) are plotted for comparison. The solid thin blue line shows that in
response to a cost-push shock the central bank raises the short rate and promises to gradually
decrease it to zero over time. When the re-optimization occurs, the central bank sets the
short rate to zero to bring inflation back to zero immediately. Since the cost-push shock is
i.i.d. all the long-term yields move to zero instantly as well. One way to gauge the effect
of the re-optimization shock is to compare the value of the yields under a re-optimization
with the value if no re-optimization shock had occurred. In figure 5, this is the difference
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between the thin blue line and the thick blue line with the crosses. To better understand
the effect on the yield curve, we construct three term structure factors that are commonly
studied in the literature: level, slope and curvature. The level is defined as just the 3 month
rate, the slope as (10 year - 3 month) and the curvature as (10 year + 3 month - 2*3 year).
Figure 6 plots the effect of the re-optimization shock on these three factors. We see that a
re-optimization shock in this model increases the slope of the term structure while lowering
the level and the curvature. Notice that the x-axis in the graph represents time and starts
when the re-optimization shock hits, i.e. period 3. In this simple model, the effect of the
cost-push shock monotonically decreases with maturity, thus when a re-optimization causes
yields to be set to their steady-state value the fall is biggest at the short end of the yield curve
and the effect diminishes with maturity. This causes the yield curve to become more steep
and less curved as a result. This simple example illustrates that, depending on the history
of past economic shocks, the re-optimization shock can generate rich dynamic responses of
interest rates. It not only affects the short-term interest rate, but can also have profound
effects on the entire yield curve.
Using a simple New Keynesian model we have shown in sections 2.4 and 2.5 that both
the degree of credibility (γ) and the timing of the re-optimization shocks can have important
implications for the yield curve. Next we conduct an empirical analysis to quantify these
effects for post Great Moderation US data. We expand the simple macro model and use a
medium scale DSGE model that is known to fit the US macro data well.
3 Medium-Scale DSGE Model
The DSGE model we use is from Smets and Wouters (2007) (SW henceforth) and
is based on earlier work by Christiano et al. (2005) among others. This model has shown
to fit the macro data well and is competitive with reduced form Vector Autoregressions in
terms of forecasting performance. The model includes monopolistic competition in the goods
and labor market, nominal frictions in the form of sticky price and wage settings, allowing
for dynamic inflation indexation. It also features several real rigidities – habit formation
in consumption, investment adjustment costs, variable capital utilization, and fixed costs in
production. For further details of the model we refer the reader to SW.10
10In the online appendix accompanying the SW paper, available at https://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/
june07/20041254_app.pdf, a detailed derivation of the model’s equations is provided.
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We depart from the SW formulation in the specification of monetary policy. In SW,
monetary policy is described by an interest rate policy rule, while in this paper the central
bank is modeled as minimizing a loss function under the loose commitment framework as
described in section 2.2. The period loss function that we use for the empirical results is the
following:
x′tWxt ≡ pi2t + wyy˜2t + wr(rt − rt−1)2 (29)
The weight on inflation (pit) is normalized to one so that wy and wr represent the weights
on output gap (y˜t) and the nominal interest rate (rt), relative to inflation. pit represents
the deviation of inflation from the steady state, implying that the inflation target is the
steady state level of inflation p¯i, which will be estimated. The target for output is the
“natural” counterpart, defined as the level of output that would prevail in the absence of
nominal rigidities and markup shocks. This formulation is consistent with the natural rate
hypothesis, i.e. that monetary policy cannot systematically affect average output. The last
term in the loss function (wr(rt − rt−1)2) indicates the central bank’s preference for interest
rate smoothing, see Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) for a detailed discussion.
3.1 Estimation
The estimation setup is similar to SW with some key differences. We use the same
quarterly US time series as SW, except we replace the fed funds rate with the 3 month Trea-
sury bill. The macro series are as follows: the log difference of real GDP, real consumption,
real investment, the real wage, log hours worked and the log difference of the GDP deflator.
In addition to the 3 month rate, we use 5 more yields: 6 month, 1 year, 3 year, 6 year
and 10 year. For the yields we use the data from Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2007). As discussed
above the dynamics of the short rate are governed according to optimal policy under loose
commitment. To avoid the stochastic singularity issue in evaluating the likelihood function,
we add an i.i.d measurement error to the short rate equation.
robst = rt + η
r
t (30)
with the assumption that ηrt ∼ N(0, σ2r). We also account for changes in the volatility of
the exogenous shocks in the regime-switching framework. A large macroeconomic literature
has showed that exogenous shocks have displayed a high degree of heteroskedasticity in the
recent US data. Here, we would like to avoid issues of inaccurate inference by explicitly
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accounting for this heteroskedasticity. The regime switching in the volatility also helps in
fitting the long end of the yield curve as we discuss below. The error terms are assumed to
be normal
vt ∼ N(0, Qsvt ),
where the variance-covariance matrix Qsvt depends on an unobservable state s
v
t ∈ {1, 2}, that
differentiates between the two alternative volatility regimes. The Markov-switching process
(svt ) evolves independently from the regime-switching process that governs re-optimizations
(st). The transition matrix for s
v
t is given by
P v =
[
Pr(st = 1|st−1 = 1) Pr(st = 2|st−1 = 1)
Pr(st = 1|st−1 = 2) Pr(st = 2|st−1 = 2)
]
=
[
p1 (1− p1)
(1− p2) p2
]
(31)
Recall that the transition matrix for the re-optimization switching is given by
P =
[
Pr(st = 1|st−1 = 1) Pr(st = 0|st−1 = 1)
Pr(st = 1|st−1 = 0) Pr(st = 0|st−1 = 0)
]
=
[
γ 1− γ
γ 1− γ
]
(32)
For convenience we define s˜t as a composite regime indicator with 4 regimes with the tran-
sition matrix P˜ = P ⊗ P v. Then for estimation we can write the system as the following
state space model.
ξt = Fs˜tξt−1 +Gvt (33)
Y obst = As˜t +Hξt + wt (34)
vt ∼ N(0, Qs˜t) (35)
wt ∼ N(0, R) (36)
The state equation (33) corresponds to the macro dynamics governed by optimal policy
under loose commitment (described earlier in equation (10)). The parameter matrix Fs˜t is
regime dependent as certain elements of the matrix are set to zero in a re-optimization state.
The observed macro variables and the yield data are stacked in Y obst and the observation
equation (34) relates them to the state variables ξt. For the macro variables the relevant
part of the matrix H just picks out the corresponding variables from the state vector ξt,
while the elements in As˜t capture the steady state constants. For the yield data in Y
obs
t , the
corresponding elements of As˜t and H capture the bond pricing equations which govern how
yields depend on the model’s state variables. The detailed derivation of the bond pricing
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equations under regime-switching is provided in an online appendix. The regime dependence
arises from the presence of the Markov switching volatility process svt . The errors vt include
all the structural shocks from the SW model. Finally, we add an i.i.d. measurement error
to each of the yields in the observation equation, given by wt.
With regards to the yields, our empirical specification has two more points worth
emphasizing. In the model, the central bank sets the short rate, here the 3 month T-bill
rate, as dictated by minimization of the loss function. Thus in our initialization of the bond
pricing recursion (equations (19) and (20)) we start with n = 1 instead of n = 0 and set
An(1) equal to the constant in the 3 month T-bill rate equation in the observation equation
and we set the corresponding element of Bn(1) = 1 which picks out the short rate from the
state vector ξt. Additionally, to help the model fit the average level of the term structure
we treat λ0 in equation (19) as a free parameter to be estimated. When we tried to let λ0
be consistent with the utility function, we found that the model underestimated the level of
the yield curve but the model’s implied slope and dynamics for the yield curve were similar
to our baseline results.
The estimation algorithm used here is similar to the one outlined in Debortoli and
Lakdawala (2016). To summarize, the regime-switching model requires using the Kim (1994)
approximation that combines the Hamilton (1989) filter and the Kalman filter to evaluate
the likelihood function, see Kim and Nelson (1999) for details. This likelihood function is
combined with the prior to form the posterior distribution. A Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
is used to sample from the posterior distribution.
3.2 Estimates from DSGE Model
We follow SW in assigning priors for the model’s structural parameters and param-
eters governing the shock processes. For the the probability of commitment γ we choose a
non-informative uniform prior over the unit interval. For the transition matrix parameters
of the regime-switching volatility process we use fairly standard Beta priors. Finally for λ0
we choose a normal prior centered at zero with a large prior variance. The details of the
priors are presented next to the posterior estimates. Table 1 shows the posterior mean of
the estimates of the structural parameters, along with the 5th and 95th percentile values.
In Table 2 the estimates of the parameters of the shock processes are shown. Overall the
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parameter estimates are similar to SW with a few exceptions.11 The elasticity estimates of
the utility function are somewhat different here relative to SW. The inverse of the elastic-
ity of intertemporal substitution (σc = 2.89 here compared to σc = 1.47 in SW) and the
labor elasticity (σl = 4.82 here vs. 2.30 in SW) are higher in our estimates. On the other
hand, the habit persistence parameter is lower in our estimates (h = 0.18 here vs. 0.68 in
SW). The persistence of the risk-preference shock (referred to by SW as the “risk-premium”
shock) is higher in our estimates (ρb = 0.98 here vs. 0.39 in SW). This shock can be broadly
thought of as a demand shock and has effects which are similar to a net-worth shock in
models that have an external finance premium. Overall, the utility function parameters are
closely tied to the stochastic discount factor and bond pricing and thus it is not surprising
that this creates the biggest differences in the parameter estimates. Our estimates of the
capital capacity utilization parameter and capital adjustment costs are also slightly higher
relative to SW. The weight on interest rate smoothing (wr) and output gap stabilization
(wy) are similar to Debortoli and Lakdawala (2016) and the general empirical literature on
optimal monetary policy. Finally there are some differences in the parameters of the price-
markup shock. See Debortoli and Lakdawala (2016) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) for
a detailed discussion.
The bottom two rows of table 1 show the unconditional regime parameters of the
volatility process p1 and p2. Both these parameters are close to one, signifying a high degree
of persistence for each regime. The standard deviation estimates (table 2) for the two regimes
do not allow for a clean identification of either regime as the high (or low) volatility regime.
The standard deviation of the technology, investment and price markup shocks is higher
in regime 2 while the standard deviation of the other 4 shocks is higher in regime 1. The
smoothed volatility regime probabilities shown in the bottom panel of figure 7 indicate that
regime 1 was likely to have prevailed for most of the 2000s, in the mid to late 1990s and
around the mid 1980s.
The probability of commitment (γ) is estimated to be 0.58 with narrow credibility
intervals. This is lower than the estimate of Debortoli and Lakdawala (2016) of 0.8 where they
do not include term structure data in the estimation. This suggests that adding yield data
to the empirical optimal policy DSGE model drives the model’s estimates of optimal policy
closer to discretion. On the [0, 1] continuum, the value of γ = 0.58 appears slightly closer
to commitment (γ = 1) than discretion (γ = 0). However, depending on the metric used,
11Given our data sample, we compare our estimates to the second sub-sample of the results reported in
Table 5 of SW.
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it could also be interpreted as being closer to discretion. For example, the use of quarterly
data implies that the Federal Reserve is expected to re-optimize plans roughly once every
two and a half quarters (in other words more than once a year). From this perspective it
would be reasonable to conclude that the results are closer to discretion (re-optimizations
every period) relative to full commitment (no re-optimizations at all). In section 3.3 we
discuss this issue in more detail.
In the loose commitment theoretical setting, both the agents and the central bank
have full information, including which regime is prevalent at any given time. This information
about the prevailing regime is not observable to the econometrician. Nevertheless, we can
back out an estimate of this by looking at the smoothed probability of re-optimization. This
can be interpreted as the probability of a re-optimization having occurred on any given date
conditional on observing all the data. We can use this probability to try to characterize
when the re-optimization episodes were likely to have occurred in the historical data. To
this end, the top panel in figure 7 we plot the smoothed probability of re-optimization.
If the there was no estimation uncertainty, γ close to 0.6 would mean that the smoothed
probability of re-optimization should be close to 1, 60% of the time and close to 0, 40% of
the time. However the figure shows that this is not quite the case and the probability is
close to 0 or 1 for only a handful of periods. For most of the other periods, it hovers around
0.6 which is the unconditional probability. If we consider a smoothed probability greater
than 0.5 as a likely re-optimization episode then we find 42 such episodes that are spread
throughout the sample. This is in line with the number of re-optimizations one would expect
in the data spanning 101 quarters with our estimate of γ close to 0.6. Given the uncertainty
involved in the estimation, if we choose a stricter cutoff point of 0.8 then it is narrowed
down to 13 re-optimization episodes.12 These episodes are clustered in the mid 1980s, early
1990s and early 2000s. Intuitively, our model identifies re-optimization episodes when there
are large differences in the path of variables with or without re-optimizations. When such
differences are small, it is more difficult to distinguish re-optimizations from continuations
of past plans, so that the smoothed probability remains near the unconditional average.
One possible interpretation of our results is that during prolonged periods with moderate
fluctuations, commitment plays a minor role, and it is therefore hard to find overwhelming
evidence in favor or against central bank’s deviations from commitment.
To evaluate how well our model fits the term structure, we start by plotting the yield
12The list is as follows 1)1983:Q3, 2)1985:Q2, 3)1985:Q4, 4)1986:Q2, 5)1986:Q4, 6)1991:Q3, 7)1991:Q4,
8)1992:Q4, 9)1996:Q3, 10)2000:Q2, 11)2001:Q2, 12)2003:Q4 and 13)2008:Q2.
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data with the corresponding model implied fit in figure 8. Overall, the model does a good
job of fitting the yield data. The estimated standard deviations of the measurement errors
range from 42 to 54 basis points at an annualized rate. In comparison, the unconditional
standard deviation of the yields in our sample is over 200 basis points for all the yields. The
model’s fit at the long end of the yield curve (10 year) does suffer slightly from the model not
being able to generate enough volatility. To get a sense of the loose commitment framework’s
ability to fit the yields, we have also estimated the DSGE model with no regime switching in
the volatility of the shocks. In this homoskedastic case, the fit of the model for short-term
yields was very similar to the results presented here but the fit of the long term yields was
significantly worse, with measurement error standard deviation of around 80 basis points for
the 10 year yield.
In addition to the regime-switching volatility in the variances of the shocks modeled
here, we believe that there are a few natural extensions that can help improve the fit in
our setting. First, De Graeve et al. (2009) use the SW model (with an interest rate rule)
and find that a time-varying inflation target significantly improves the fit of the longer
yields. For example, the shock to the inflation target in their paper explains more than 90%
of the variation in the 10 year yield. Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) also acknowledge the
importance of the time-varying inflation target in matching yield data. Second, time-varying
term premia could be induced by allowing parameters of the utility function to change. Dew-
Becker (2014) uses this approach by modeling time variation in the risk-aversion parameter.
Finally, rather than assuming an i.i.d. re-optimization shock, we can introduce a Markov
structure in the transition matrix governing the re-optimization shocks. With this state-
dependence in the re-optimizations, the factor loading of bond prices in the term structure
solution will be dependent on the monetary policy regime and contribute to time-variation in
bond risk premia. These approaches could be adopted in our current framework. However,
since our paper represents the first effort to study the empirical effects on the term structure
of Federal Reserve credibility and re-optimization shocks, we leave these extensions for future
research.13
Next, we discuss the contribution of the various macroeconomic shocks in explaining
the variation in the yield curve. In table 3 we present the forecast error variance decompo-
sition, where we weight the the coefficients under each regime by the steady state regime
13Additionally, Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) show that using Epstein-Zin preferences in a DSGE model
can help drastically improve the fit of the model. But that would require a higher-order approximation to
solve the model which would make the computation of optimal policy and estimation intractable.
23
probabilities. We consider short (1 quarter), medium (5 quarters) and long (20 quarters) fore-
cast horizons. For the purpose of this exercise, following SW we lump together government
spending, investment and risk preference shocks into a unified demand shock. Additionally
we lump together the price markup and wage markup shocks into a unified markup shock.
A few interesting results stand out. Markup and demand shocks are important drivers of
yield curve while technology and monetary policy shocks contribute very little. Demand
shocks explain a significant variation of the yield curve fluctuation at all maturities but for
the short and medium term forecast horizons, the effect is hump shaped in maturity. At
these forecast horizons, demand shocks have the maximum effect on yields at the medium
end of the curve. For example, demand shocks explain almost three-quarters of the variation
in the 3 year yield in the medium term. On the other hand, markup shocks have the biggest
effect on longer maturity yields at all forecast horizons. At the short end of the yield curve,
the monetary policy shock contributes a significant share to the variance but its contribu-
tion diminishes to essentially zero with the forecast horizon. The contribution of structural
shocks to historical U.S. data will be important in determining the effects of re-optimization
shocks, as we will discuss in section 3.4.
3.3 Comparison with Discretion and Full Commitment
In this section we start by asking the following question: How would the historical
path of yields have been different if the Federal Reserve had acted under full commitment or
discretion? To answer this question we perform a counterfactual simulation. We first back
out the structural shocks for our model from the benchmark estimates. Next, fixing these
shocks we simulate the path of interest rates while changing the probability of commitment
to 0 (for discretion) and 1 (for full commitment). These simulations are presented in figure
9, where the red, blue and black lines represent the data, full commitment and discretion
cases respectively. This graph shows that neither full commitment nor discretion can capture
the term structure dynamics satisfactorily. The longer end of the yield curve (6 and 10 year
yields) is closer to full commitment (especially in the 1980s and 1990s). Whereas for the
medium end of the yield curve there are certain periods (mid 1990s) where the data is closer
to discretion. We also notice a pattern that holds for most of the simulation periods that
the yields would have been lower on average under discretion relative to full commitment.
In section 2.5 analysis of impulse responses we discussed how the path of yields under loose
commitment do not necessarily have to lie in between the discretion and full commitment
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cases. The two key components that matter are the timing of the re-optimization shocks
and the history of structural shocks. This point can be seen clearly from the counterfactual
simulation and will be discussed again using impulse response analysis in section 3.4.
The loose commitment setting nests both the cases of commitment (γ = 1) and dis-
cretion (γ = 0). The empirical estimates imply a higher weight for the posterior distribution
at γ = 0.6 as compared to γ = 0 or γ = 1. Thus the data prefer a model with loose commit-
ment over discretion or commitment. However a potentially different way to estimate the
model at the end points is to use a strategy that fixes the parameter γ = 0 or γ = 1. Such a
strategy has two potential advantages to our baseline loose commitment model. First, one
less parameter needs to be estimated and second the estimation uncertainty involved with
the regime-switching due to re-optimizations is avoided. To explore whether this alterna-
tive empirical strategy has any material advantage we separately estimate the commitment
and discretion versions of the model and compare them to the baseline model. To keep
the comparison fair, for all specifications we model regime-switching in the variance of the
shocks.
With a Bayesian estimation framework, a natural way to perform model comparison
is to calculate the posterior odds. With a priori equal weight associated to each model the
Bayesian posterior odds ratio boils down to comparing the marginal likelihood. We use the
modified harmonic mean estimator with the truncated normal weighting function suggested
by Geweke (1999). Let y1:t = [Y obs1 , Y
obs
2 , ...Y
obs
t ] denote a vector of data from period 1 up to
t. Gathering all the parameters in Θ, the marginal likelihood is given by
p
(
y1:T
)
=
∫
p(y1:T |Θ)pi(Θ)dΘ (37)
Table 4 shows the log marginal likelihood for the three different specifications of the models.
The marginal likelihood is highest for our baseline estimate of γ = 0.58. The difference with
the next best case is almost 50 log points pointing to strong evidence for the loose commit-
ment framework, in line with the results in Debortoli and Lakdawala (2016). Interestingly,
the model fit for discretion is considerably better than the full commitment case. Thus our
model with yield curve data also confirms the optimal monetary policy literature that focuses
solely on discretion vs full commitment (see for example Givens (2012) that discretion fits
the data better than full commitment.
25
3.4 Effect of Re-optimization Shocks
What is the effect of a re-optimization shock on the yield curve? In the loose com-
mitment framework, the effects of a re-optimization depend on the history of past shocks,
as discussed in section 2. Figures 10, 11, and 12 illustrate this phenomenon showing the
impulse responses to a technology, price-markup shock and demand (risk-preference) shock
respectively. The solid blue line shows the path under the assumption that a re-optimization
never occurs (even though agents expect it to occur with probability 0.6). The line with dots
refers to the scenario where a re-optimization occurs once after 5 quarters, but not after that.
The difference between the two lines thus measures the effects of a policy re-optimization
that occurs after period 5. The figure also shows the impulse responses under discretion
and commitment which are obtained by just setting γ = 0 and γ = 1 but keeping the rest
of the parameters fixed at the estimated values for the baseline model. The effect of a re-
optimization that is preceded by a price-markup shock (figure 11) or risk-preference shock
(figure 12), is to make yields lower relative to the case where no re-optimization occurs. The
intuition is similar to the one in the simple model of section 2, where the central bank would
like to bring inflation and interest rates to their steady-state levels sooner. On the other
hand, a re-optimization shock that occurs after a technology shock, makes the central bank
want to set interest rates higher than promised, as can be seen in figure 10. The sign of the
effect is similar for yields of all maturities but the magnitude varies. To better understand
the differential effects on the yield curve, in figure 13 we plot the effects of a re-optimization
shock on the three factors: level, slope and curvature. We define these in the same way as in
section 2.5. The level factor as just the 3 month rate, the slope factor as 10 year - 3 month
and the curvature factor as 10 year + 6 month - 2*(3 year). Specifically, we plot the difference
between the thin blue line and the thick blue line with the dots (from figures 11-12). Notice
that the x-axis in the graph represents time and starts when the re-optimization shock hits,
i.e. period 5. Each row shows the effect after a specific structural shock. There emerges an
interesting pattern in the dynamics responses of the three factors. The sign of the response
of the level and curvature factors to a re-optimization is the same regardless of the type of
structural shock we consider, while the slope response has the opposite sign. Moreover, the
effect on the factors peaks a few quarters after the re-optimization. It is important to note
that in addition to the effects of a re-optimization depending on which shocks have preceded
it, the timing of those shocks matter as well. As an extreme example, when the economy is
in the steady state, a re-optimization will have no effect. On the other hand if a structural
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shock has hit the economy, and a few quarters have passed (which allow the effects of the
shock to peak), then a re-optimization shock can have big effects.
Next, using our model and estimated structural shocks, we try to quantify the effects
of re-optimization shocks in the historical U.S. data. We answer the following hypothetical
question: Given the past history of shocks in the U.S. data (implied by our model), what
would be the effect if a re-optimization occurred in every period? To this end, we plot
the difference between the reaction of yields if a re-optimization occurs relative to the case
where one does not occur, conditional on the estimated structural shocks. Using the model’s
equations, this can be written as [in,t|st = 0, ξt−1] − [in,t|st = 1, ξt−1], where in,t refers to
the yield of maturity n. ξt−1 represent the smoothed state variables that capture the full
history of shocks up to time t − 1. Figure 14 shows this difference for the 6 yields. The
dashed black vertical lines represent time periods when re-optimization periods are most
likely, as discussed in section 3.2. As observed in the impulse response figures, we notice
that re-optimizations can act as both contractionary and expansionary shocks. However
the contractionary effect of re-optimization shocks appears to dominate in magnitude and
frequency, with the biggest effects in the early 1990s and early 2000s and just before the
financial crisis. This reinforces the notion that the quantitative effect of a re-optimization
is crucially dependent on past historical shocks. The effect on the yield curve is also non-
monotonic in the maturity. The biggest effect is felt by the 1 year yield followed closely by
the 6 month yield. The effect on the long end is much smaller, with negligible effects on the
10 year yield.
To explore this non-monotonic effect of re-optimizations in more detail, we also con-
sider the the response of the constructed term structure factors. Additionally, note that
figure 14 plots only the contemporaneous response of yields to a re-optimization shock. But
the analysis in figure 13 suggests that there can be lags in the effects. Thus in figure 15 we
consider the “medium-term” and “long-term” effects in addition to the contemporaneous ef-
fect. Specifically, we plot [fk,t+j|st = 0, ξt−1]− [fk,t+j|st = 1, ξt−1] where fk,t+j is the response
of the kth term structure factor in time period t+ j. The blue line is the contemporaneous
response (j = 1 quarter), the green line is the “medium-term” response (j = 8 quarters) and
the red line is the “long-run” response (j = 40) quarters.14 Again, the dashed black verti-
14To clarify, the medium and long term response is calculated in the following way. We assume a re-
optimization occurs only once in time period t and then trace out the response of the yields. From this
response we subtract the behavior of the yields in the scenario where a re-optimization does not occur. The
other shocks are set to zero from period t onwards.
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cal lines represent time periods when re-optimization periods are most likely, as discussed
in section 3.2. Similar to figure 14, the graph shows that the re-optimization episodes in
the early 1990s and 2000s have had the biggest effect on the yield curve while the other
re-optimization episodes have had smaller effects.
Additionally, the biggest effects of the re-optimization shock occur in the medium
term. The contemporaneous effects are smaller and the long-term effects are almost negligi-
ble. Finally for comparison, the standard deviation of the level, slope and curvature factors
calculated from the data is 2.22, 1.23 and 0.80 respectively. This suggests that relative
to the overall movement in the factors, re-optimization shocks have accounted for a bigger
proportion of the variation in the curvature of the yield curve. This can be explained by
the non-monotonic relationship shown in figure 14. Re-optimization shocks have the biggest
effect on the medium term bonds while having a smaller effect on short term and long term
bonds.
4 Conclusion
The Federal Reserve is keenly interested in understanding how changes in its policy
instruments (typically the short interest rate) translate into changes in the economy. This
transmission mechanism works through the effect of the policy instrument on the long rates.
Instead of using the standard Taylor rule setup, this paper focuses on optimal monetary
policy and central bank credibility to get a deeper structural understanding of the effects
of central bank actions on the term structure. In a simple model we explain the intuition
behind how our flexible loose commitment framework affects the yield curve by comparing
it to the commonly used discretion and full commitment cases. We highlight two features
that can have important implications for the yield curve: the existing degree of credibility
and the timing and frequency of re-optimization shocks.
We quantify these effects by estimating a medium-scale DSGE model where the cen-
tral bank conducts optimal policy under loose commitment. This structural macro model is
augmented with bond prices that are consistent with agents’ optimization decision and the
resulting system is jointly estimated using regime-switching Bayesian techniques. Consistent
with earlier work, we find that the Federal Reserve is credible to some extent, but that cred-
ibility is not perfect. Moreover, neither full commitment nor discretion can do a satisfactory
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job of explaining term structure dynamics. Additionally, we find that re-optimization shocks
affect the middle of the yield curve more as compared to the short and long end. This creates
a relatively bigger impact of the re-optimization shocks on the curvature of the yield curve.
A natural extension is to allow the probability of re-optimization to be regime-
dependent rather than the i.i.d. case that is used this in paper. While this would make
the computation of optimal policy under loose commitment more complicated, it would
have the advantage of generating a time-varying term premium where the underlying model
can still be linear. Such a setup would make it feasible to conduct an empirical study where
re-optimization shocks could provide a structural explanation for the change in the term
premium over time.
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Prior Posterior
Distr. Mean Std. Dev Mean 5% 95%
l¯ St. State Labor Normal 0 2 -3.963 -5.971 -1.846
p¯i St. State Inflation Gamma 0.62 0.1 0.996 0.948 1.069
γ¯ Growth Rate Normal 0.4 0.1 0.300 0.270 0.328
β¯ Discount Factor Gamma 0.25 0.1 0.378 0.177 0.632
α Capital Income Share Beta 0.3 0.05 0.155 0.136 0.175
ψ Capital Cap. Utilization Normal 0.5 0.15 0.917 0.858 0.963
ϕ Capital Adj. Cost Normal 4 1.5 7.539 5.652 9.467
σc Risk Aversion Normal 1.5 0.37 2.887 2.640 3.148
h Habit Persistence Beta 0.7 0.1 0.175 0.129 0.223
σl Wage Elasticity Normal 2 0.75 4.820 3.982 5.732
Φ Fixed Cost Normal 1.25 0.12 1.039 0.982 1.109
ιw Wage Indexation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.472 0.233 0.717
ιp Price Indexation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.195 0.096 0.312
ξp Price Stickiness Beta 0.5 0.1 0.883 0.849 0.913
ξw Wage Stickiness Beta 0.5 0.1 0.400 0.330 0.473
wy Output Gap Weight Gamma 1 1 0.010 0.006 0.015
wr Interest Rate Weight Gamma 1 1 1.781 1.313 2.364
γ Prob. of Commitment Uniform 0.5 0.29 0.582 0.518 0.645
λ0 Const in SDF Normal 0.0 2.0 3.224 2.912 3.577
p1 Vol. prob 1 Beta 0.8 0.16 0.988 0.979 0.995
p2 Vol. prob 2 Beta 0.8 0.16 0.982 0.968 0.993
Table 1: The table reports the prior distribution (mean and standard deviation) and the es-
timated posterior mean, fifth, and ninety-fifth percentiles for the baseline model’s structural
parameters.
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Prior Posterior
Distr. Mean Std. Dev Mean 5% 95%
Standard deviations
σ
(1)
a Inv Gamma 0.1 2 0.429 0.369 0.494
σ
(1)
b Inv Gamma 0.1 2 0.067 0.053 0.082
σ
(1)
g Inv Gamma 0.1 2 0.440 0.382 0.503
σ
(1)
I Inv Gamma 0.1 2 0.375 0.315 0.444
σ
(1)
p Inv Gamma 0.1 2 0.127 0.104 0.154
σ
(1)
w Inv Gamma 0.1 2 0.510 0.398 0.647
σ
(1)
r Inv Gamma 0.1 2 0.137 0.101 0.182
σ
(2)
a Inv Gamma 0.1 2 0.701 0.620 0.786
σ
(2)
b Inv Gamma 0.1 2 0.055 0.044 0.066
σ
(2)
g Inv Gamma 0.1 2 0.269 0.240 0.306
σ
(2)
I Inv Gamma 0.1 2 0.389 0.325 0.463
σ
(2)
p Inv Gamma 0.1 2 0.151 0.125 0.180
σ
(2)
w Inv Gamma 0.1 2 0.408 0.321 0.513
σ
(2)
r Inv Gamma 0.1 2 0.078 0.062 0.097
σi6m Inv Gamma 0.5 0.5 0.108 0.093 0.123
σi1yr Inv Gamma 0.5 0.5 0.137 0.120 0.156
σi3yr Inv Gamma 0.5 0.5 0.127 0.111 0.144
σi6yr Inv Gamma 0.5 0.5 0.120 0.107 0.136
σi10yr Inv Gamma 0.5 0.5 0.121 0.106 0.138
MA parameters (µ) and AR parameters (ρ)
µw Beta 0.5 0.2 1 0.410 0.222 0.594
µp Beta 0.5 0.2 1 0.793 0.705 0.869
ρga Beta 0.5 0.2 1 0.240 0.146 0.334
ρa Beta 0.5 0.2 1 0.979 0.975 0.983
ρb Beta 0.5 0.2 1 0.982 0.968 0.993
ρg Beta 0.5 0.2 1 0.964 0.950 0.976
ρI Beta 0.5 0.2 1 0.715 0.655 0.773
ρp Beta 0.5 0.2 1 0.996 0.992 0.999
ρw Beta 0.1 0.2 1 0.984 0.974 0.994
Table 2: The table reports the prior distribution (mean and standard deviation) and the esti-
mated posterior mean, fifth, and ninety-fifth percentiles for the baseline model’s parameters
describing the shock processes.
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Horizon Technology Demand Markup Monetary
6 month
1 Q 0.03 0.37 0.32 0.28
5 Q 0.04 0.57 0.36 0.03
20 Q 0.02 0.80 0.17 0.01
1 year
1 Q 0.04 0.54 0.37 0.05
5 Q 0.05 0.58 0.37 0.01
20 Q 0.03 0.70 0.27 0.00
3 year
1 Q 0.04 0.68 0.27 0.01
5 Q 0.04 0.72 0.23 0.00
20 Q 0.03 0.68 0.29 0.00
6 year
1 Q 0.04 0.69 0.26 0.01
5 Q 0.04 0.66 0.29 0.00
20 Q 0.04 0.51 0.45 0.00
10 year
1 Q 0.07 0.48 0.44 0.00
5 Q 0.07 0.42 0.50 0.00
20 Q 0.07 0.30 0.62 0.00
Table 3: This table shows the contribution of the structural shocks in explaining the forecast
error variance of the yield curve. See section 3.2 for more details.
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Model Log Marginal Likelihood
Loose Commitment (γ = 0.58) -209.85
Discretion (γ = 0) -258.19
Full Commitment (γ = 1) -369.3
Table 4: The table shows the marginal likelihood calculations for three different models. The
first row shows the baseline model where γ is estimated. The discretion and full commitment
model estimation fixes γ to 0 and 1 respectively.
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Figure 1: Impulse-response to i.i.d. cost-push shock. The green line shows the response of
macro variables under full commitment while the red line shows the response under discre-
tion.
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Figure 2: Impulse-response to i.i.d. cost-push shock. The green line shows the response
of macro variables under full commitment while the red line shows the response under dis-
cretion. The blue lines show the responses under loose commitment: the solid blue line
assumes that no re-optimizations occur while the blue line with dots shows responses where
a re-optimization occurs only in the third period.
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Figure 3: The figure shows the average slope of the yield curve as a function of the probability
of commitment (γ). Panel (a) uses the calibration with σθ < 1, while panel (b) uses a
calibration with σθ > 1
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Figure 4: The figure shows the unconditional standard deviation of the yield curve as a
function of the probability of commitment (γ). Panel (a) uses the calibration with σθ < 1,
while panel (b) uses a calibration with σθ > 1
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Figure 5: Impulse-response of yields to i.i.d. cost-push shock. The green line shows the
response under full commitment while the red line shows the response under discretion. The
blue lines show the responses under loose commitment: the solid blue line assumes that no
re-optimizations occur while the blue line with dots shows responses where a re-optimization
occurs only in the third period.
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Figure 6: This figure shows the effects of re-optimization shock on the term structure factors
following a cost-push shock. The cost-push shock occurs in period 1, followed by a re-
optimization shock in period 3. The graph shows the path after the re-optimization shock
relative to a case where no re-optimization shock occurs. The level factor is defined as just
the 3 month yield, the slope factor as (10 year - 3 month) and the curvature factor as (10
year + 3 month - 2*3 year) yields. See section 2.5 for more details.
42
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Probability of Re−optimization
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Probability of Variance Regime 1
Figure 7: The figure shows the smoothed probability of being in a re-optimization state (up-
per panel), and of being in variance regime 1 (lower panel) for the posterior mean estimates
from the medium-scale DSGE model.
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Figure 8: The dashed red lines in the figure show the actual yield data. The solid blue lines
show the model’s fit.
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Figure 9: The figure reports counterfactual simulations under full commitment (blue line)
and discretion (black line), keeping the structural shocks fixed at their estimated values.
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Figure 10: Impulse responses to a 1 standard deviation technology shock under alterna-
tive commitment settings. The blue lines indicate the responses under loose commitment;
the solid one assumes that no re-optimizations occur and dashed blue line displays a re-
optimization occurring after the 5th quarter, but not afterwards. The green and red line
show the responses under full commitment and discretion respectively.
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Figure 11: Impulse responses to a 1 standard deviation price markup shock under alterna-
tive commitment settings. The blue lines indicate the responses under loose commitment;
the solid one assumes that no re-optimizations occur and dashed blue line displays a re-
optimization occurring after the 5th quarter, but not afterwards. The green and red line
show the responses under full commitment and discretion respectively.
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Figure 12: Impulse responses to a 1 standard deviation demand (risk-preference) shock
under alternative commitment settings. The blue lines indicate the responses under loose
commitment; the solid one assumes that no re-optimizations occur and dashed blue line
displays a re-optimization occurring after the 5th period, but not afterwards. The green and
red line show the responses under full commitment and discretion respectively.
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Figure 13: This figure shows the effects of re-optimization shock on the term structure
factors following the structural shocks. The structural shock occurs in period 1, followed by
a re-optimization shock after period 5. The graph shows the path after the re-optimization
shock relative to a case where no re-optimization shock occurs. The level factor is defined
as just the 3 month yield, the slope factor as (10 year - 3 month) and the curvature factor
as (10 year + 3 month - 2*3 year) yields. See section 3.4 for more details.
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Figure 14: The figure shows the effects of re-optimizations on yields over time, measured as
the difference between the value conditional on re-optimization and the value conditional on
continuation of previous commitment.
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Figure 15: The figure shows the effects of re-optimizations on terms structure factors over
time, measured as the difference between the value conditional on re-optimization and the
value conditional on continuation of previous commitment. The level factor is defined as
just the 3 month yield, the slope factor as (10 year - 3 month) and the curvature factor as
(10 year + 3 month - 2*3 year) yields.
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